Glass v. Phila. Elec. Co. by unknown
1994 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
9-8-1994 
Glass v. Phila. Elec. Co. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1994 
Recommended Citation 
"Glass v. Phila. Elec. Co." (1994). 1994 Decisions. 128. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1994/128 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 1994 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
                              
       
                    
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
        FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
                  
 
 No. 92-1896 
                  
 
 
 HAROLD GLASS, 
 
      Appellant 
 
          v. 
 
 PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY 
 
                                        
 
 Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
 D.C. Civil Docket No. 90-06370 
 
 
                                   
 
 Argued: July 1, 1993 
 
 Before:  BECKER, ALITO and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion Filed:  September 8, 1994) 
 
                                   
 
 
Alice W. Ballard, Esquire (Argued) 
Lynn Malmgren, Esquire 
Samuel & Ballard 
225 South 15th Street, Suite 1700 
Philadelphia, PA 19102 
          Attorneys for Appellant 
 
Dona S. Kahn, Esquire (Argued) 
Hope A. Comisky, Esquire 
Richard G. Tuttle, Esquire 
Anderson, Kill, Olick & Oshinsky 
1600 Market Street, Suite 1416 
Philadelphia, PA 19103 
          Attorneys for Appellee 
 
                      
 
 OPINION OF THE COURT 
                      




ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
 
 Harold Glass appeals from a jury verdict in favor of 
the Philadelphia Electric Company ("PECO") in his action claiming 
race discrimination, age discrimination, and retaliation in 
employment.  Glass alleges that the district court abused its 
discretion when it repeatedly made evidentiary rulings against 
him, excluding his evidence concerning the allegedly racially 
hostile work environment at PECO's Eddystone Plant (the 
"Eddystone evidence") where he worked from 1984 to 1986.  Glass 
claims that he was substantially prejudiced by the district 
court's rulings for two reasons.  First, while the district court 
excluded Glass's Eddystone evidence, it admitted PECO's evidence 
of Glass's performance at Eddystone.  Consequently, Glass was 
prohibited from telling his side of the story.  Second, Glass 
claims that the excluded Eddystone evidence is relevant to the 
issue of pretext. 
 We conclude that the district court erred in excluding 
Glass's Eddystone evidence.  We find that the error was not 
harmless; hence, we will reverse the district court's judgment 
and remand for a new trial.1 
                     
1.  Glass also appeals on the grounds that the district court's 
instructions to the jury on pretext contained an incorrect legal 
standard.  In light of our disposition, we will not reach this 
issue.  We will leave to the district court the opportunity, in 
light of the evidence presented on remand, to draw up appropriate 
jury instructions, following the precedents set forth in St. 





 Glass worked at PECO for 23 years before he retired in 
1990.2  During his career, Glass worked in three different 
capacities: clerical (1967 to 1984), technical (1984 to 1986, and 
1989 to 1990), and employee advocate (1986 to 1989). 
 While working full-time, Glass attended school to 
improve his career opportunities.  In May 1982, he received an 
Associate Degree in Electrical Electronics Engineering 
Technology.  In December 1987, he received an Associate Degree in 
Engineering.  In May 1988, he received a Bachelor of Science 
Degree in Industrial and Management Engineering.  In December 
1988, he received a Bachelor of Science Degree in Engineering.  
PECO supported Glass's initiatives to obtain higher education by 
covering all of his tuition expenses through their tuition 
reimbursement program. 
 In addition to his full-time work and continuing 
education, Glass was an activist on behalf of PECO employees.  
His involvement with issues of employee and labor relations began 
in 1968, when, along with other minority employees, he helped 
organize the Black Grievance Committee ("BGC") to respond to 
problems of racial fairness at PECO, including inadequate 
(..continued) 
progeny.  See, e.g., Hook v. Ernst & Young,     F.3d     (3d Cir. 
1994). 
2.  Glass chose to take early retirement as part of a plan 
offered by PECO during an overall cost cutting program caused by 
the need for economic retrenchment. 
 
 
representation of minorities by PECO's uncertified labor 
organization, the Independent Group Association ("IGA"). 
 For 20 years, from 1968 to 1988, Glass served as an 
officer of the BGC.  He represented employees in handling routine 
individual grievances before management and negotiated with 
management about employee concerns. 
 In addition, he served as the lead in organizing 
witnesses in three actions against PECO concerning racially 
discriminatory employment practices.  In the early 1970's he was 
a chief organizer in a pattern and practice race discrimination 
action filed in federal court against PECO.  (Harold Glass, et. 
al. v. PECO).  He was also an organizer and primary contact with 
counsel in another federal pattern and practice race 
discrimination suit, Black Grievance Committee, et. al. v. PECO, 
which resulted in a settlement that removed barriers to black 
employees' opportunities, increased employee productivity, 
improved the communications between PECO and its employees, and 
affected supervisory behavior as a result of an affirmative 
action training module.  In 1982, Glass filed an unfair labor 
practice charge with the NLRB that resulted in a complaint and 
settlement requiring PECO to recognize the BGC in its employee 
handbook as an alternative source for employees seeking help in 
matters of discrimination or affirmative action.  (NLRB v. PECO). 
The settlement also resulted in a creation of the BGC/IGA Liaison 
 
 
Representative, the position which Glass held during the years 
1986 through 1989. 
 Throughout his 23 years of employment with PECO, Glass 
received only one performance evaluation which was less than 
fully satisfactory.  This occurred while he was serving as a 
junior technical assistant ("JTA") at Eddystone.  During that 
time, Glass alleges that he was the target of racial harassment 
by his co-workers. He further suggests that the harassment had a 
negative effect upon his work performance. 
 In 1982, Glass unsuccessfully applied for the position 
of Affirmative Action Officer in Human Resources.  In early 1989, 
having obtained two baccalaureate engineering degrees, he sought 
a promotion from the position of JTA to that of Engineer; 
however, he never heard from the three departments to which he 
applied.  When he inquired later about the status of these 
applications, he was told that "some of the people were scared to 
take a chance on [him]."  App. at 121.  In particular, management 
pointed to his poor performance evaluation while at the Eddystone 
Station.  App. at 114. 
 In late 1989, Glass applied for posted vacancies of 
Labor Relations Representative (three vacancies) and Affirmative 
Action Staff Assistant (one vacancy).  Glass was rejected in both 
cases, in favor of younger white applicants because of 
management's claim that he was not a "team player," App. at 155, 
a reference to management's perceptions of Glass's tenure or 
 
 
conduct as an employee advocate.  In addition, PECO filled other 
positions, without posting, that Glass would like to have been 
considered for, including that of Affirmative Action Officer, 
which was filled again in 1987, and that of Employee Relations 
Specialist, which was filled once in 1988 and once in 1989, by a 
white candidate in each case. 
 Glass left the position of Liaison Representative in 
early 1989 and returned to technical work as a JTA.  He retired 
at age 54 from this position.  When he was not selected to fill 
the aforementioned job openings at PECO in 1989 and 1990, Glass 
brought this action against PECO on October 3, 1990, claiming 
that he was discriminated against on the basis of his race and 
age and in retaliation for his activities as a minority advocate. 
 The District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania had subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1334 over this claim which alleges violations 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981; the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000, et seq.; and the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq.  The 
district court exercised supplemental jurisdiction over claims 
brought under the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 43 P.S. § 
951, et seq.  We have jurisdiction over Glass's appeal pursuant 




 We review pre-trial and trial court rulings concerning 
the admission or evidence for an abuse of discretion.  In re 
Japanese Electronic Products, 723 F. 2d 238, 260 (3d Cir. 1983), 
rev'd on other grounds, Matsushita Electronic Industrial Co., 
Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).  Similarly, we 
review the district court's decision to include or exclude 
evidence arising under the Federal Rules of Evidence 401, 402 and 
403 for an abuse of discretion.  Pfeiffer v. Marion Center Area 
School District, 917 F.2d 779, 781-82 (3d Cir. 1990).  We have 
explained that "error may not be predicated upon a ruling which 
admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the 
party is affected . . . ."  Linkstrom v. Golden T. Farms, 883 
F.2d 269, 269 (3d Cir. 1989); Fed. R. Evid. 103(a).  In reviewing 
evidentiary rulings, if we find nonconstitutional error in a 
civil suit, such error is harmless only "if it is highly probable 
that the error did not affect the outcome of the case."  Lockhart 
v. Westinghouse Credit Corp., 879 F.2d 43, 53, 59 (3d Cir. 1989). 
 A. 
 We note at the outset that the trial court admitted 
PECO's evidence of Glass's conduct at Eddystone and excluded 
Glass's Eddystone evidence without articulating a balance between 
the probative value and the prejudicial effect of the evidence as 
required by Fed. R. Evid. 4033 and the jurisprudence of this 
                     
3.  Fed. R. Evid. 403 states: 
 Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
 
 
Court.  See, e.g., United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1243 
(3d Cir. 1985) (declining to decide the Rule 403 question where 
the district court neither mentioned Rule 403 on the record nor 
"conducted the balancing required by that rule"); United States 
v. Long, 574 F.2d 761, 770 (3d Cir.) (Adams, concurring) (the 
record should reflect, at least minimally, that balancing 
occurred), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 985 (1978).  Therefore, it is 
not clear for purposes of our review that the district court 
actually excluded any evidence under Rule 403 despite the 
district court's language suggesting that its rulings involve 
some Rule 403 concerns, i.e.:  "Let's not relitigate the 
Eddystone matter.  I'll sustain the objection."  App. at 358. 
 PECO contends that the trial court conducted a Rule 403 
balancing when it granted PECO's pre-trial motion in limine.  As 
PECO had requested, the district court ordered that no evidence 
would be admitted at trial in two categories:  1) pre-May 1989 
evidence about alleged discriminatory treatment of Glass by PECO 
that predates the statutory period covered by Glass's current 
claims, and 2) evidence of prior settlement agreements or consent 
decrees entered into by PECO.  While the district court's order 
does not give any reasons for granting PECO's motion, Glass's 
motion in opposition to PECO's motion in limine appears to invoke 
Rule 403 by opposing PECO's claims that the evidence "is 
(..continued) 
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue 




prejudicial, confusing and will promote delay in the 
proceedings."  App. at 3. 
 If we consider PECO's motion in limine as the 
equivalent of a specific Rule 403 objection to the Eddystone 
evidence, then "we must confront the trial court's failure to 
articulate its balance between the probative value and the 
prejudicial effect of the evidence in one of two ways:  either we 
decide the trial court implicitly performed the required balance; 
or, if we decide the trial court did not, we undertake to perform 
the balance ourselves."  United States v. Eufrasio, 935 F.2d 553, 
572 (3d Cir. 1991) (citation omitted).  Independent of either 
method, "the trial court's failure to expressly articulate a Rule 
403 balance when faced with a Rule 403 objection, would not be 
reversible error per se."  Id. 
 If, on the other hand, we decide that PECO's motion in 
limine did not constitute a specific Rule 403 objection to the 
admission of the Eddystone evidence, then the trial court was not 
required to strike a Rule 403 balance on the record sua sponte.4  
We note that PECO's and Glass's understanding of what the trial 
court did is significant to our analysis.  Both parties 
                     
4.  "Since the 'specific' objection requirement of Fed. R. Evid. 
103(a) was not complied with, the trial judge was not required to 
deal with Rule 403. . . .  [T]he dynamics of trial do not always 
permit a Rule 403 analysis in . . . detail . . ..  [T]o require a 
detailed balancing statement in each and every case is 
unrealistic. . . .  [W]here [a] Rule 403 [objection] is not 
invoked, the trial judge's balancing will be subsumed in his 
ruling."  United States v. Long, 574 F.2d 761, 766 (3d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 985 (1978) (emphasis added).   
 
 
communicated at oral argument their belief that the trial judge 
based his evidentiary rulings on Rule 403. 
 We determine, however, that we do not in fact need to 
base our decision here on a resolution of whether or not PECO's 
pre-trial motion in limine constituted a Rule 403 objection.5  
Reviewing the trial transcript, including, on the one hand, the 
references by the defense to Glass's performance at Eddystone and 
the effect his poor performance rating there had on his later 
attempts at promotion and, on the other hand, the proffers made 
by Glass at those times as to what he would show concerning the 
impact of the racial harassment on his performance and his 
performance evaluation, we conclude that the district court's 
repeated refusal to grant Glass's attempts to admit the Eddystone 
evidence was an abuse of discretion. 
 B. 
 On the second day of trial at a sidebar conference, the 
court ruled that evidence of the allegedly hostile racial 
environment at Eddystone in the mid-1980's was inadmissible.  
Glass's counsel made the following offer of proof: 
 BALLARD:  If permitted, I would also offer evidence of 
the environment Mr. Glass encountered at Eddystone 
Station when he went there as a junior technical 
assistant in 1984 to show why he had difficulty 
                     
5.  Indeed, it may be difficult for the district court at the 
pre-trial stage to make an adequate assessment of the Rule 403 
balancing.  See In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litigation, 916 F.2d 
829, 859-60 (3d Cir. 1990) ("[I]n order to exclude evidence under 
Rule 403 at the pretrial stage, a court must have a record 
complete enough on the point at issue to be considered a virtual 
surrogate for a trial record.")   
 
 
performing there, to show that he was the victim of a 
discriminatory and harassing environment there.  And I 
understand Your Judge's ruling of two -- Your Honor's 
ruling of two days ago to say that I should stay away 
from that as well. 
 
 THE COURT:  That's correct. 
App. at 66.  Glass contends that, if the Eddystone evidence had 
been admitted, it would have shown that the more senior technical 
employees posted hostile and demeaning images about him on the 
plant premises and that he was the subject of racially derogatory 
remarks.  It would also have shown that the training and 
performance of junior technical assistants depended directly on 
the goodwill and support of the more experienced technical 
assistants and senior technical assistants who train and evaluate 
the junior technical assistants.  Glass maintains that his 
behavior and his opportunity to learn and perform effectively was 
impaired by the hostile environment in which he worked. 
 The trial court repeatedly sustained PECO's objections 
to Glass's attempts to introduce evidence concerning these 
events.  Glass testified that his activities on behalf of 
employees and as BGC/IGA Representative qualified him for the 
position of Labor Relations Representative.  The requirements for 
the job of Labor Relations Representative were: a  "bachelor's 
degree in human resource management or labor relations, or 
significant labor relations work experience or equivalent 
combination of work experience and successful completion of 
college courses covering such areas as labor relations, general 
 
 
accounting, managerial accounting, and/or compensation and 
benefits."  Glass had both an appropriate college degree (B.S., 
Industrial and Management Engineering) and the relevant 
coursework.  He also had equivalent work experience developing 
and handling employee grievances, negotiating with management and 
settling major lawsuits related to employee relations and labor 
law.  His academic background and his work experience qualified 
him for the job and afforded him an interview with James Lange, 
Director of Labor Relations. 
 Even though Glass had met the education requirements 
and had the experiential background in labor relations, a 
qualification characterized as "preferred" on the job posting, he 
was rejected in favor of younger, white candidates, none of whom 
had comparable employee or labor relations experience.  Lange 
testified that one reason he rejected Glass was his poor 
performance at Eddystone.  Glass attempted to pursue the extent 
of Lange's knowledge of the Eddystone events on cross-
examination: 
 Q  No, my question is the previous 
performance that you identified as one of the 
reasons why you turned him down. ... 
 
 A  Uh-huh. 
 
 Q  ... that was his performance at Eddystone, 
isn't it? 
 
 A  In part. 
 
 Q  Now, did you do any investigation 
regarding his performance at Eddystone to see 
 
 
whether he had been the victim of unfair 
treatment there?  
 
 A   No, I did not. 
 
 Q  Did he tell you that he had been the 
victim of unfair treatment there? 
 
 A  Yes, he had. 
 
 Q  Did he tell you that people had posted 
hostile pictures of him on the wall  ... 
 
         MS. KAHN:  Objection, ... 
 Q  ... when he was ... 
 
         MS. KAHN: ... Your Honor. 
 
 Q  ... at Eddystone? 
 
         THE COURT:  Let's not relitigate the 
Eddystone matter.  I -- I'll sustain the 
objection.    
 
App. at 357-58. 
 PECO also claimed that Glass was rejected because of 
poor interpersonal skills, the focus of the testimony of Malcolm 
Riley, Glass's boss at Eddystone.  Riley testified about Glass's 
role as BGC representative while at Eddystone during the same 
period.  Glass was not permitted to cross-examine Malcolm Riley 
about the relationship between the hostile work environment and 
Riley's judgment that Glass's behavior during this time evidenced  
poor interpersonal skills: 
 Q   Do you remember a time, Mr. Riley, when 
somebody at Eddystone Station put some 
pictures up on the board of Harold Glass? 
 
          MS. KAHN:  Objection, Your Honor.  
Objection, Your Honor.  This is constantly 
 
 
brought into the case.  It was ruled that it 
was not relevant. 
 
          THE COURT:  I agree.  Now, let me 
see counsel one moment at sidebar. 
App. at 404. 
 Glass was similarly denied the opportunity to introduce 
evidence of the circumstances at Eddystone in the context of his 
claim that PECO's refusal to hire him as an engineer in 1989-90 
was discriminatory.  Alvin Weigand, head of the engineering 
division in which Glass worked, testified that he told Glass that 
a promotion to engineer would be conditioned on his 
satisfactorily performing in a JTA position for two years.  Glass 
denied having ever been told that the probationary period was for 
two years but instead understood that a waiting period of 
indefinite duration was being imposed on him.  In any event, a 
probationary period, whether two years or open-ended, was not 
applied to any other degreed candidate for an engineering job.  
Glass declined the job. 
 At trial, Weigand testified that he imposed the 
probationary period because of Glass's poor performance while at 
Eddystone.  Glass attempted to pursue the extent of Weigand's 
knowledge of the Eddystone events on cross-examination: 
 Q   Now, you said that you were aware of his 
past performance problems, in the technical 
field.  How did you know what kinds of 
problems you thought he had had?  Sorry.  
That's a terrible question.  What, quote, 





 A   I was aware that he was not receiving 
satisfactory performance appraisals in his 
JTA job at Eddystone Station, and I was aware 
that he was not being promoted to TA which is 
the normal progression, and that was in my 
organization, down a couple levels. 
 
 Q   Were you aware that he had had difficulty 
on the job at Eddystone of a personal nature 
in connection with the other employees? 
 
  MS. KAHN:  Objection, Your honor.  
Again, we're going back into history which 
was ruled irrelevant. 
 
 THE COURT:  The objection's sustained. 
 
App. at 426.  With PECO's objection sustained, Glass was 
repeatedly unable to introduce any evidence concerning the 
racially hostile environment at Eddystone station, management's 
failure to take corrective action when it learned of the 
harassment, or the connection between these incidents and his 
negative performance evaluation. 
 We find that the district court abused its discretion 
for the following reasons:  First, in the federal courts, the 
scope of permissible cross-examination is set forth in Fed. R. 
Evid. 611(b):  "Cross-examination should be limited to the 
subject matter of the direct examination and matters affecting 
the credibility of the witness."  See also United States v. 
Sullivan, 803 F.2d 87, 90 (3d Cir. 1986).  The district court 
erred by allowing PECO's witnesses, Lange, Riley and Weigand, to 
testify about their knowledge of the events at Eddystone but then 
 
 
not allowing Glass to cross-examine those witnesses as to the 
basis or extent of their knowledge. 
 Second, we find that the Eddystone evidence is 
independently relevant to a key aspect of the case:  whether one 
of the principal non-discriminatory reasons asserted by PECO for 
its actions was in fact a pretext for age or race discrimination.  
In St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, the Supreme Court confirmed 
that, under the well-established burden-shifting formula of 
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), and Texas 
Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 253 (1981), in a 
Title VII case alleging employment discrimination: 
 First, the plaintiff has the burden of 
proving by a preponderance of the evidence a 
prima facie case of discrimination.  Second, 
if the plaintiff succeeds in proving the 
prima facie case, the burden shifts to the 
defendant to articulate some legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason for the employee's 
rejection.  Third, should the defendant carry 
this burden, the plaintiff must then have an 
opportunity to prove by a preponderance of 
the evidence that the legitimate reasons 
offered by the defendant were not his true 
reasons, but were a pretext for 
discrimination. 
Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252-53; see St. Mary's Honor Center, 113 
S.Ct. at 2749 (reaffirming "our repeated admonition that the 
Title VII plaintiff at all times bears the 'ultimate burden of 
persuasion'" of intentional discrimination).  This formula 
applies equally to claims of age discrimination in employment 
under ADEA.  See Chipollini v. Spencer Gifts, Inc., 814 F.2d 893, 
 
 
897 (3d Cir. 1987) (in banc).  Since Glass had introduced 
sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case and PECO had 
asserted several nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions, 
including Glass's poor performance at Eddystone, the Eddystone 
evidence is relevant and should have been admitted to help Glass 
meet his burden of proving intentional discrimination as Glass's 
counsel proposed in her proffer on three occasions during the 
trial.  The district court's rejection of Glass's proffers was 
error.  The preclusion of the evidence deprived Glass of a full 
hearing on the issue of pretext and was, therefore, not harmless 
error; rather, it is highly probable that the evidentiary rulings 
affected the outcome of the case.  Lockhart v. Westinghouse 
Credit Corp., 879 F.2d 43, 53 (3d Cir. 1989).6 
 Our decision is buttressed by the judicial 
inhospitability to evidentiary exclusions in discrimination 
cases.  The Eighth Circuit explained in reversing similar 
evidentiary exclusions in an employment discrimination suit: 
 The effects of blanket evidentiary exclusions 
can be especially damaging in employment 
discrimination cases, in which plaintiffs 
must face the difficult task of persuading 
the fact-finder to disbelieve an employer's 
account of his own motives. 
 
                     
6.  A Rule 403 balancing, if requested, would be a part of any 
ruling on a particular aspect of the Eddystone evidence, as such 
evidence might be relevant to the issue of pretext.  We conclude, 
however, that such a balancing of particular items of Eddystone 
evidence would be better made on remand by the trial judge, as 
testimony is proffered, than it would by us, out of context, at 
this stage of the proceedings. 
 
 
   . . .  
 
 Circumstantial proof of discrimination 
typically includes unflattering testimony 
about the employer's history and work 
practices -- evidence which in other kinds of 
cases may well unfairly prejudice the jury 
against the defendant.  In discrimination 
cases, however, such background evidence may 
be critical for jury's assessment of whether 
a given employer was more likely than not to 
have acted from an unlawful motive. 
Estes v. Dick Smith Ford, Inc., 856 F.2d 1097, 1103 (8th Cir. 
1984). 
 Citing this passage from Estes, the Eighth Circuit in 
Hawkins v. Hennepin Technical Center, 900 F.2d 153, 155 (8th Cir. 
1990), reversed summary judgment for the defendant in a disparate 
treatment sex discrimination case holding that the district court 
abused its discretion in barring the plaintiff from introducing 
evidence of prior sexual harassment of herself and other 
employees of the defendant.  The magistrate judge had determined 
that any evidence, beyond the fact that the plaintiff had filed 
certain harassment complaints against the defendant in the past, 
was not relevant to the plaintiff's claim that she suffered 
disadvantageous employment decisions as a result of her gender 
and in retaliation for complaints of sexual harassment made by 
her while employed by the defendant. 
 The court of appeals disagreed, finding that evidence 
of the nature of the harassment complaints and the defendant's 
disposition of those complaints was highly relevant to the 
plaintiff's case because "an atmosphere of condoned sexual 
 
 
harassment in a workplace increases the likelihood of retaliation 
for complaints in individual cases."  900 F.2d 156.  See also 
Hunter v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 797 F.2d 1417, 1421 (7th Cir. 
1986) (affirming district court's decision to admit plaintiff's 
evidence of harassment against other black workers in case 
alleging racially discriminatory discharge because "evidence was 
relevant both in showing that Allis Chalmers condoned racial 
harassment by its workers and in rebutting Allis Chalmers' 
defense that it had fired Hunter for cause."). 
 
 III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the 
district court abused its discretion by repeatedly barring Glass 
at trial from introducing evidence about the hostile work 
environment at Eddystone and from eliciting testimony of how it 
related to Glass's performance, which, according to PECO, had 
operated to defeat his candidacy for the positions of Labor 
Relations Representative and Engineer.  We will, therefore, 




Glass v. Philadelphia Electric 
No. 92-1896  
 
 
ALITO, Circuit Judge, dissenting:  
 
 
 Harold Glass, who was employed for many years by the 
Philadelphia Electric Company ("PECO"), sued his former employer 
for allegedly discriminating against him based on race and age 
and for allegedly retaliating against him because of his pursuit 
of other discrimination claims.7  His case was tried before a 
jury, and the jury was requested to answer special 
interrogatories that asked whether PECO had discriminated against 
the plaintiff on the basis of race or age or had illegally 
retaliated against him when it failed to promote him to a variety 
of positions that were filled in the late 1980's.  The jury found 
no such discrimination or retaliation, and the court entered 
judgment for PECO. 
 On appeal, the plaintiff contended, among other things, 
that the district court abused its discretion under Fed. R. Evid. 
403 by excluding evidence that he had been subjected to a 
racially hostile environment when he worked at PECO's Eddystone 
Generating Station in the mid-1980's.  The plaintiff argued that 
this evidence was relevant to show that PECO's asserted reasons 
for denying the promotions were pretextual and that this evidence  
                     
7.  He asserted claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 623; 42 U.S.C. § 1981; and the 
Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 43 P.S. § 951 et seq.   
 
 
should not have been excluded under Rule 403.  See Appellant's 
Br. at 17-26.  The majority agrees with the plaintiff's argument 
and therefore reverses the judgment of the district court and 
remands for a new trial.  In doing so, the majority makes little 
effort to explain why the excluded evidence had probative value 
or to address  the factors weighing against exclusion.  In my 
view, when both sides of the Rule 403 balance are carefully 
considered and the proper standard of appellate review is 
applied, the district court's rulings under Fed. R. Evid. 403 
must be sustained.  Moreover, even if those rulings were 
incorrect, they were harmless with respect to several of the 
positions at issue.  For these reasons, I dissent. 
 
 I.  
 Before addressing the merits of the district court's 
evidentiary rulings, I will briefly supplement the procedural 
history set out in the majority opinion.  Prior to trial, PECO 
filed a motion in limine seeking to preclude the plaintiff from 
introducing evidence of discriminatory acts that allegedly 
occurred before "the statutory period covered by the charge 
[Glass] filed with the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission 
and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. . . ."  
Defendant's Motion In Limine at 1.  PECO argued that this 
evidence was not relevant under Fed. R. Evid. 401 and that it 
 
 
should in any event be excluded under Fed. R. Evid. 403.  PECO 
stated: 
 [E]ven if this Court were to conclude that 
some or all of this evidence might be 
marginally relevant and otherwise admissible, 
if it is introduced, the Court will be forced 
to preside over -- and defendants will be 
forced to defend against -- numerous 
collateral matters to be tried within the 
main trial.  These mini-trials would concern 
actions by decision-makers who were not 
involved at all in any of the action in the 
fall and winter of 1989 that Glass is 
challenging in this case.  In many instances, 
they would concern events which occurred many 
years before the events actually in 
controversy here.  Furthermore, by admitting 
this evidence, the jury will hear an 
overabundance of tangential, collateral and 
irrelevant issues which will undoubtedly 
confuse its consideration of the true issues 
in this case.  There would be at least 
several extra days of trial time and 
ultimately, should this evidence be admitted, 
defendant will be unfairly prejudiced in its 
defense. 
 
Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant's Motion In Limine at 
4-5.  See also id. at 15-16.   
 The plaintiff then filed a lengthy memorandum in 
opposition to this motion.  In this memorandum, the plaintiff 
stated that he "propose[d] to introduce evidence of his 
employment history, including his activities as an employee 
representative, to prove he was qualified for the positions he 
now claims he was denied because of his age and race."  App. 3-4.  
After describing the plaintiff's work as a officer of the Black 
Grievance Committee, the memorandum stated: 
 
 
 [T]he story of Mr. Glass' activism directly 
supports his contention that he was qualified 
for the jobs he was denied, and that despite 
these qualifications, he was rejected for 
pretextual reasons. . . . 
 
 
  In short, Mr. Glass' pre-1989 evidence 
is relevant for the purpose of showing that 
he was particularly qualified for the 1989-
1990 positions, and that this entire history 
of activism in employee and labor relations 




App. 9-10.  The memo also stated: 
 [I]t is important to note what Plaintiff does 
not intend with regard to pre-1989 evidence.  
Plaintiff Glass does not intend to make 
actionable any of Defendant's promotional 
decisions which predate the limitations 
period in this action.  Nor does Plaintiff 
intend to prove the existence of a pattern or 
practice of discrimination. . . . 
 
 
App. 8-9.  Not once in this memo did the plaintiff state that he 
proposed to introduce evidence that he was subjected to racial 
harassment or a racially hostile work environment during the 
period when he worked at PECO's Eddystone station (from 1984 to 
1986) or at any other time.8   
 PECO next filed a reply memorandum.  PECO argued that 
the plaintiff's pre-1989 experience representing other employees 
was not relevant with respect to several of the positions to 
                     
8.  8.  Nor was harassment or a racially hostile environment at 
Eddystone mentioned in the plaintiff's affidavit in opposition to 
the motion in limine. 
 
 
which he claimed he should have been promoted.  However, with 
respect to some other positions -- the position of Affirmative 
Action Staff Assistant and three positions as a Labor Relations 
Representative -- PECO offered "to stipulate that plaintiff's 
activities on behalf of other employees provided him with the 
experience to meet certain criteria set forth in the job 
requisitions" for those positions.  Rely Memorandum of Law in 
Support of Defendant's Motion In Limine at 7.   
 The plaintiff then filed a surreply objecting to the 
proposed stipulation because it would deprive him of "the 
opportunity to present the depth and texture of those 
qualifications to a jury."  App. 16.  This surreply, like the 
plaintiff's prior memorandum, made absolutely no mention of 
racial harassment or a racially hostile atmosphere at Eddystone 
or anywhere else. 
 After receiving these submissions, the district court, 
a few days before trial, entered an order granting PECO's motion.  
Because the district court did not explain the basis for its 
ruling, it is unclear whether the court held that the evidence of 
pre-1989 events was not relevant or whether the court concluded 
that the evidence should be excluded under Rule 403.  In any 
event, however, I do not think that the plaintiff can attack this 
ruling on the ground that it improperly precluded him from 
proving that he had been subjected to racial harassment at 
Eddystone prior to 1989.  Having explained to the district court 
 
 
precisely what evidence of pre-1989 events he wanted to introduce 
and precisely why he wanted to introduce that evidence, and 
having said nothing about evidence of racial harassment or a 
racially hostile atmosphere at Eddystone or anywhere else, the 
plaintiff cannot, in my view, argue that the district court erred 
in failing to admit such evidence.  See Fed. R. Evid. 103(a)(2); 
Northeast Women's Center, Inc. v. McMonagle, 868 F.2d 1342, 1352-
53 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 901 (1989).   
 When the trial began two days after the district 
court's order granting the motion in limine had been entered and 
sent to the parties, the plaintiff's counsel made an oral offer 
of proof, and the following colloquy occurred: 
  MS. BALLARD [plaintiff's counsel]:  If 
permitted, I would also offer evidence of the 
environment Mr. Glass encountered at 
Eddystone Station when he went there as a 
junior technical assistant in 1984 to show 
why he had difficulty performing there, to 
show that he was the victim of a 
discriminatory and harassing environment 
there.  And I understand your Judge's ruling 
of two -- Your Honor's ruling of two days ago 
to say that I should stay away from that as 
well. 
 
  THE COURT:  That's correct. 
 
  MS. BALLARD:  All right.  And that would 
include the pictures that were placed on the 
wall that . . . 
 
  THE COURT:  Right. 
 
  MS. BALLARD:  . . . degraded Mr. Glass' 
personality. 
 
  THE COURT:  Right.  All these rulings 
are made without prejudice to your renewing 
 
 
them if at a later time it turns out from the 
testimony that it might be appropriate to 
bring that in.  But on your case in chief, 




 While this oral offer of proof, unlike the plaintiff's 
prior memoranda, referred to evidence of racial harassment at 
Eddystone, plaintiff's counsel still did not explain how proof of 
this harassment, apparently by co-workers,9 was relevant to prove 
that PECO officials had discriminated or retaliated against the 
plaintiff when they denied him certain promotions years later.  
In particular, plaintiff's counsel did not claim that this 
evidence was relevant to show that PECO's reasons for denying the 
plaintiff these promotions were pretextual.  Thus, if I had been 
the trial judge, I am not sure that I would have grasped, based 
on the plaintiff's prior memoranda and this short exchange, that 
the plaintiff was proposing to prove the harassment at Eddystone 
for the purpose of showing pretext.  But even if it is assumed 
that the plaintiff's oral offer of proof was sufficient to convey 
this point, the fact remains that the trial judge did not 
categorically bar proof of the events at Eddystone.  On the 
contrary, the judge expressly stated that his rulings on the 
motion in limine were "made without prejudice to the [the 
plaintiff's] renewing them if at a later time it turn[ed] out 
                     
9.  See App. 405-06. 
 
 
from the testimony that it might be appropriate to bring that 
in."  App. 67.  Accordingly, I do not think that the cases cited 
by the majority concerning "blanket evidentiary exclusions" (see 
Maj. Typescript at 16 (quoting Estes v. Dick Smith Ford, Inc., 
856 F.2d 1097, 1103 (8th Cir. 1984)) are at all pertinent.10  
Instead, I think that it was incumbent on the plaintiff to renew 
his request to admit evidence concerning events at Eddystone as 
the trial developed.  The plaintiff did so; the district court 
then ruled; and it is these specific rulings, in my view, that we 
must review. 
 The exchanges that led to these specific rulings are 
quoted in the opinion of the court (see Maj. Typescript at 11-
14), and therefore I will not repeat them here.  I will, however, 
note two salient features of these exchanges.  First, at no point 
did the plaintiff's attorney refer to the concept of "pretext" or 
provide a clear explanation of the relevance of the Eddystone 
evidence.  Second, at no point did the trial judge refer to Rule 
403 or provide a clear explanation of the basis of his rulings 
                     
10.  The two cases discussed by the majority -- Estes  and 
Hawkins v. Hennepin Technical Center, 900 F.2d 153, 155 (8th 
Cir.) cert. denied, 498 U.S. 854 (1990), -- are readily 
distinguishable from the current case on at least two important 
grounds.  First, those cases concern pretrial orders 
categorically prohibiting the admission of certain evidence, 
whereas in this case the trial judge expressly stated that his 
pretrial order was made without prejudice to the plaintiff's 
attempt to admit the evidence at a later point.  Second, in Estes 
and Hawkins, unlike this case, introduction of the evidence in 




excluding the evidence in question.  Faced with this ambiguous 
record, I think it is appropriate to give both sides the benefit 
of the doubt.  Consequently, I construe the remarks of 
plaintiff's counsel as having preserved the argument that the 
Eddystone evidence was relevant to show pretext, and (like 
counsel for both parties11) I construe the district court's 
ruling as having been based on an implicit balancing pursuant to 
Rule 403.  See United States v. Eufrasio, 935 F.2d 553, 572 (3d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 340 (1991).  In this regard, I 
note that the district court did say that it did not want to 
"relitigate the Eddystone matter" (App. 358), and I interpret 
this reference as essentially accepting PECO's argument in favor 
of exclusion under Rule 403.  If this interpretation of the 
district court's reasoning is too generous, it is no more 
generous than my reading of the plaintiff's explanation of the 
relevance of the Eddystone evidence.  Thus, based on these 
interpretations of the record, it seems to me that the issue 
before us is the following:  did the district court commit 
reversible error in concluding that the Eddystone evidence's 
probative value for the purpose of proving pretext was 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by 
considerations of undue delay and waste of time?   
See Fed. R. Evid. 403.  I therefore turn to this question. 
                     




 II.  
 According to our precedents, "[a] trial judge is given 
`very substantial discretion' when striking a Rule 403 balance."  
Eufrasio, 935 F.2d at 572.  A trial judge's ruling under Rule 403 
may be reversed only if the judge committed an abuse of 
discretion.  Id.  Indeed, we have held that "a trial judge's 
decision to admit or exclude evidence under Fed. R. Evid. 403 may 
not be reversed unless it is `arbitrary and irrational.'"  Bhaya 
v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 922 F.2d 184, 187 (3d Cir. 1990), 
cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1217 (1991), (quoting United States v. 
DePeri, 778 F.2d 963, 973-74 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 
U.S. 1110 and 476 U.S. 1159 (1986)); see also United States v. 
Friedland, 660 F.2d 919, 929 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 
U.S. 989 (1982); United States v. Long, 574 F.2d 761, 767 (3d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 985 (1978).  We have also observed: 
 If judicial self-restraint is ever desirable, 
it is when a Rule 403 analysis of a trial 
court is reviewed by an appellate tribunal. 
 
United States v. Long, 574 F.2d at 767; see also Eufrasio, 935 
F.2d at 572.  As the Seventh Circuit aptly wrote in a case quite 
similar to this one: 
 The balancing of probative value and prejudicial 
effect, like other comparisons of intangibles, requires 
an exercise of judgment rather than a computation.  
Only in an extreme case are appellate judges competent 
to second-guess the judgment of the person on the spot, 
the trial judge. 
 




498 U.S. 897 (1990) (citation omitted).   
  
 Applying an abuse-of-discretion standard, I think that 
the trial judge's ruling in this case must be sustained.  I 
recognize that evidence that the plaintiff was subjected to 
racial harassment or a racially hostile atmosphere at Eddystone 
has some probative value for the purpose of showing that PECO's 
reliance on plaintiff's poor evaluation while at Eddystone was 
pretextual.  If the plaintiff was harassed at Eddystone, that 
harassment might have caused or contributed to his poor 
performance rating.  Thus, evidence of harassment at Eddystone is 
relevant to show that the plaintiff's performance rating for that 
period was inaccurate.  The plaintiff's poor rating at Eddystone 
was cited as a reason for PECO's denial of the plaintiff's 
requests for promotion to positions as a Labor Relations 
Specialist and to an engineering position.  If the officials who 
made the decisions concerning these promotions knew or believed 
that the Eddystone evaluation had been affected by the harassment 
and was therefore inaccurate, that would tend to show that their 
reliance on this rating was pretextual.  Consequently, proof of 
the plaintiff's harassment at Eddystone could form part of a 
chain of reasoning leading to the inference that the PECO 
decisionmakers discriminated or retaliated against the plaintiff. 
 But while the evidence of harassment at Eddystone that 
the plaintiff was precluded from introducing thus has some 
probative value, its probative value is limited.  First, with 
 
 
respect to the positions as a Labor Relations Representative, 
PECO did not rely heavily on the plaintiff's performance at 
Eddystone as an explanation for its decisions.  The official 
responsible for filling these positions, James Lange, listed 
numerous other reasons why he did not choose the plaintiff.  
Among other things, Lange mentioned:  his belief that the 
plaintiff was unable "to function as a change agent" and was 
"wedded to the past way of doing things" (9/25/92 Tr. at 154-56); 
his concern about the plaintiff's "ability to be objective in the 
area of labor relations" (id. at 163); his view that the 
plaintiff was not a "team player" (id. at 163-64); PECO's policy 
of giving preference to candidates from within the same 
department (9/29/92 Tr. at 109); the plaintiff's failure to meet 
educational requirements (id. at 113); and concerns about the 
plaintiff related to "issues like credibility, confidentiality, 
[and] trustworthiness."  Id. at 168.  Moreover, while Lange 
stated that he had initially been concerned about the plaintiff's 
performance at Eddystone, he added that, when he heard the 
plaintiff's explanation of the reason for his poor rating during 
that period, this explanation "helped alleviate some of the 
concerns."  9/25/92 Tr. at 158.  Second, the plaintiff was able 
to bring out some evidence of harassment at Eddystone.  His 
attorney elicited testimony that the plaintiff had told Lange 
that he had been a "victim of harassment" and had "experience[d] 
problems."  Id. at 158-59.  Third, it seems to me that the 
 
 
probative value of evidence of harassment at Eddystone was 
substantially undermined by the plaintiff's unwillingness to 
argue that the PECO decisionmakers who were responsible for 
denying him the promotions at issue believed that the Eddystone 
evaluation was inaccurate.  As I previously explained, it appears 
to me that evidence of harassment at Eddystone is relevant 
primarily, if not exclusively, as part of a chain of reasoning 
that includes, as one link in the chain, the conclusion that PECO 
officials cited the Eddystone evaluation as a reason for their 
decisions even though they did not actually believe that this 
evaluation was an accurate reflection of the plaintiff's 
abilities.  Plaintiff's counsel has argued strenuously, however, 
that she did not want to prove that the PECO decisionmakers lied 
when they gave their reasons for not promoting the plaintiff.12  
Instead, the plaintiff's theory was that these officials were 
guilty of "unconscious forms of pretext."13  Putting aside the 
question of whether, as a matter of law, a plaintiff in a 
disparate treatment case may prevail based on evidence of 
"unconscious" discrimination,14 it seems to me that the 
                     
12.  "[M]endacity," she stated, "was not in my proof."  I think 
that the defense witnesses in this case were telling the truth 
when they [gave the reasons for their decisions].  Oral Argument 
Tr. at 12. 
13.  Id. at 53. 
14.  Compare International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United 
States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977), with David Benjamin 




plaintiff's reliance on this unconventional theory substantially 
diminished the probative value of the evidence of harassment at 
Eddystone. 
 On the other side of the Rule 403 balance, I think that 
there is substance to PECO's contention that permitting proof of 
the alleged discrimination at Eddystone might have led to a mini- 
trial and caused substantial unfair prejudice.  As PECO put it in 
its brief: 
 Had Glass been permitted to prove the events 
which he contends influenced his performance 
evaluations at Eddystone, PECO would have 
been entitled to offer proof (1) that the 
events did not occur as Glass contended; and 
(2) that his performance evaluation would 
have been negative whether or not such events 
occurred.  The results would have been trials 
on two collateral issues -- a trial on the 
occurrence vel non of incidents of 
harassment, and a trial concerning the 
effect, if any, of such events on Glass's 
performance during 1984 and 1985.  Together, 
these two trials-within-a-trial would have 
been equal in scope and complexity to the 
trial that was actually held. 
 
Appellee's Br. at 14 (footnotes omitted).  Even if PECO's 
estimate of the length and complexity of this "minitrial" is 
exaggerated, I still think that these considerations were 
legitimate and weighed appreciably in favor of exclusion.  
Furthermore, introduction of evidence of harassment at Eddystone 
might well have led the jury to believe that these events were 
part of a pattern of discrimination by PECO and, since even the 
plaintiff did not advance such a claim (see supra, at 4), the 
 
 
introduction of this evidence had a potential for causing PECO 
unfair prejudice. 
 In short, there are clearly factors on both sides of 
the Rule 403 balance, and reasonable minds can differ as to 
whether that balance tilts in favor of admission or exclusion of 
the Eddystone evidence.  My colleagues obviously believe that the 
balance tilts in favor of admission.  Our function, however, is 
not to balance the Rule 403 factors ourselves.  Rather, we are 
supposed to afford substantial deference to the balance struck by 
the trial judge and, if that is done, his rulings in this case 
must be sustained.  His rulings did not constitute abuses of his 
discretion.  They most certainly were not arbitrary or 
irrational.  Bhaya, 922 F.2d at 187.  And this case is surely not 
one of those "extreme case[s]" in which appellate judges may 
properly "second-guess the judgment" of the trial judge.  Sims, 
902 F.2d at 531.15 
 Moreover, even if the trial judge's rulings constituted 
abuses of his discretion, those rulings were harmless with 
respect to the positions as Labor Relations Representative.  As 
                     
15.  In addition to concluding that the district court abused its 
discretion under Fed. R. Evid. 403, the majority states that the 
district court's rulings were erroneous for an additional reason, 
viz., because they improperly limited the scope of cross-
examination under Fed. R. Evid. 611(b).  Maj. typescript at 14.  
This analysis is flawed, in my view, because the district court 
did not rely on Rule 611(b) in excluding the evidence at issue 
and because Rule 611(b) does not prevent a trial judge from 
excluding evidence under Rule 403 during cross-examination.  See 




noted (see pages 11-12 supra), Lange, in discussing those 
positions, provided a long list of other reasons for not 
selecting Glass, and Lange stated in effect that he did not rely   
heavily on Glass's performance at Eddystone.  Thus, even if Glass 
had succeeded in showing that Lange's relatively minor reliance 
on the Eddystone evaluation was pretextual, it is "highly 
probable" that the jury's verdict concerning the positions as 
Labor Relations Representative would not have been affected.  See 
Lippay v. Christos, 996 F.2d 1490, 1500 (3d Cir. 1993); McQueeny 
v. Wilmington Trust Co., 774 F.2d 916, 924 (3d Cir. 1985).  
Accordingly, any erroneous evidentiary rulings made by the 
district court were harmless with respect to those positions.  
 For these reasons, I dissent.   
